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We test the significance of the relationship between the exchange rate regime and the 
degree of structural reforms by estimating panel regressions for a world and an OECD 
country sample. The empirical results suggest a positive correlation between on the one 
side the adoption of an exchange rate rule and on the other side overall structural re-
forms as well as reforms in the money and banking sector in the broad country sample. 
For government size and for market regulation, we do not find any robust significant 
effect, however. The results do not confirm the main implication of Calmfors-type mod-
els, namely a higher degree of reforms under monetary policy autonomy. They corrobo-
rate conditional policy convergence and, partly, that limiting monetary policy autonomy 
fosters structural reforms. 
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1. Introduction 
The pressing problem of unemployment and the choice of the appropriate monetary 
policy strategy are crucial challenges in current academic and political debates. Al-
though both issues are usually connected in public, the academic discussion had ne-
glected, until the mid-nineties, to provide rational arguments for such an interrelation. 
Until then, the incentives and disincentives for labor, product and financial market re-
forms and liberalization on the one side and the benefits and costs of monetary policy 
rules on the other side had typically been analyzed in isolation.  
The pros and cons of different monetary policy strategies are usually investigated in the 
framework of Barro and Gordon (1983, 1983a) and Kydland and Prescott (1977). Both 
contributions focus on the time inconsistency of discretionary monetary policy (which 
presupposes monetary policy autonomy) and compare the efficiency of alternative 
monetary policy rules with the potential losses due to the inflexibility of rules under 
exogenous shocks. As possible solutions to the trade-off between the time-inconsistency 
problem of discretionary monetary policy and the inflexibility of rule-based monetary 
policy, various flexible rules have been proposed. Prominent examples of such limita-
tions of policy autonomy are feedback-rules in connection with distinct commitment 
technologies, e.g. the independence of central banks or incentive schemes for central 
bankers (Walsh, 1995; Persson and Tabellini, 1993; Svensson, 1997). 
However, the first-best solution to this problem is to remove labor market rigidities, the 
fundamental cause of high structural unemployment (Svensson, 1997: 104,  109; Duval 
and Elmeskov, 2005: 5).
1 Yet, such a proposal could be regarded as rather naive from a 
public choice perspective which emphasizes that labor market institutions, as an out-  -2-
come of rational political choice, have to be implemented in the loss function of politi-
cians. In this paper, we argue that the design of labor market institutions can be inter-
preted as the result of utility maximizing political decisions. Therefore, it appears useful 
to augment the time-inconsistency models by an explicit consideration of labor market 
reforms. 
Cross-country event studies are one approach to empirically examine the impact of 
monetary policy strategies on the degree of economic reform. There are severe limita-
tions, however. The U.S., e.g., are a monetary union with labor market institutions that 
encourage a low natural rate of unemployment. The EMS commitment was extremely 
helpful in fostering the reform process in the Netherlands and Denmark. The same holds 
for Austria under the DM peg (Hochreiter and Tavlas, 2005). In contrast, the U.K. and 
New Zealand experienced extensive labor market reforms without adhering to an inter-
national exchange rate arrangement. Hence, we choose an econometric analysis for a 
large sample of countries. Thereby, we go beyond the EMU case studies by van Poeck 
and Borghijs (2001), Bertola and Boeri (2001), and IMF (2004) which are rare exam-
ples of empirical investigations in this field.
2 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the main argu-
ments concerning the relationship between monetary policy autonomy and structural 
reforms in open economies. We also present a simple stylized monetary model of em-
ployment and reform effort. Section 3 derives the analytical results from the benchmark 
model. Finally, we also obtain testable hypotheses concerning the impact of exchange 
rate flexibility on reforms. Panel estimates on the relationship between the exchange 
rate regime and the degree of reforms  are presented in section 4. The regressions in-
clude a set of additional variables and extensive robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.   -3-
2. Theory 
2.1 Conflicting views on the relation between the degree of 
monetary policy autonomy and structural reforms 
The discussion of the relation between the degree of monetary policy autonomy and 
structural reforms is characterized by a wide spectrum of conflicting views. We start 
with a sketch of the literature on monetary policy autonomy and reforms and refer to a 
prominent example of the loss of monetary autonomy, i.e. the irrevocable fixing of ex-
change rates under European Monetary Union (EMU). In the run-up to EMU a number 
of studies tried to assess the incentive effects of alternative monetary policy strategies 
on labor market reforms. According to the proponents of a liberal view, EMU, as a clas-
sical variant of a rule-based monetary policy, should have a disciplinary impact on na-
tional labor markets.
3 In the first place, EMU enhances the credibility of monetary pol-
icy and thereby lowers inflation expectations. Negative employment effects as a result 
of (too) high wage claims can no longer be accommodated by discretionary monetary 
policy. The responsibility of wage setters for unemployment increases significantly, 
because they no longer negotiate about nominal wage but real wage growth. The re-
sponsibility for existing unemployment is more transparently assigned to the parties 
which negotiate the relative price of labor. In contrast, autonomous discretionary mone-
tary policy makes it more difficult to remove market rigidities because there is still the 
option to solve or at least to shift the unemployment problem onto third parties. i.e. to 
an expansionary monetary policy.  
Insofar as the single currency increases transparency, the costs of structural rigidities, as 
reflected in relative prices, become more evident. Lower trading costs and higher trans-
parency jointly tend to foster competition in goods markets, which in turn reduces the   -4-
available product market rents . If these rents are smaller, the incentive to resist reforms 
that prevent such rents to be captured are smaller as well. 
Overall, the incentives for extensive reforms of goods, labor, and capital markets in-
crease under a regime of irrevocably fixed exchange rates.
4 If changes in monetary pol-
icy and the nominal exchange rate are not available, and if labor is immobile as is the 
case in most parts of the Euro area, there is no other option than to undertake reforms in 
order to facilitate the market-based adjustment to shocks. Hence, credible currency peg-
ging has often been interpreted as a version of Mrs. Thatcher’s There-Is-No-Alternative 
(TINA) strategy.
5 In this paper, we intend to generalize this striking TINA argument 
empirically and extend it to countries beyond the narrow focus of the Euro area, which 
is what e.g. Duval and Elmeskov (2005) concentrate on. 
However, there are also important arguments against a positive impact of monetary 
rules on economic reform. First, based on OECD macro model simulations it was often 
argued with respect to EMU that the so-called up-front costs of structural reforms may 
be larger within a currency union. This holds especially in large, relatively closed coun-
tries for which changes in the nominal exchange rate are not so effective in alleviating 
the necessary “crowding-in” effect. Removing restrictions in financial markets tend to 
stimulate demand more than labor market reforms and hence allow an easier and 
quicker “crowding-in” of reforms (Bean, 1998, Duval and Elmeskov, 2005: 6-7, Saint-
Paul and Bentolila, 2000). Hence, the prior in this case would be that rule-based mone-
tary policy regimes like, e.g., EMU, lead to more reforms in the financial market than in 
the labor market.   -5-
Second, Calmfors (1997) and Sibert and Sutherland (1997) argue that one should not 
expect from monetary policy with its mainly short-run real economy effects to diminish 
structural unemployment significantly. Hence, rule-based monetary policy does not nec-
essarily imply more reform pressure. In the same line, empirical analysis indicates that 
the capability of exchange rates to absorb asymmetric shocks to labor and goods 
markets is rather low. Hence, flexibility of exchange rates does not seem to be a good 
substitute for reforms and the degree of reforms is not necessarily higher under fixed 
exchange rates (Belke and Gros, 1999).  
Third, some analysts support the view that rule-based monetary policy, at least if it 
takes effect through entering a fixed exchange rate regime, has no disciplinary effects 
on the wage setting process, but leads to centralization processes and strengthens the 
incentives to claim high wages on the part of unions. Fourth, the limited evidence of 
price structure convergence for instance among core-EMS countries as compared with 
other countries speaks against any significant impact of credible exchange rate stabiliza-
tion on product market competition. Hence, there are still product market rents to be 
captured and there will still be resistance to reforms (Haffner et al., 2000). From these 
introductory remarks it should be clear that the implementation of specific monetary 
policy rules significantly changes the conditions for and the efficiency of structural re-
forms (Calmfors, 1997, 1998; Grüner and Hefeker, 1996). Let us assume for the mo-
ment that the main aim of labor market, product market and fiscal reforms is to lower 
structural unemployment and that the term monetary policy rule is used in a more gen-
eral fashion, i.e. that it comprises both monetary and exchange rate policy. The assess-
ment of different monetary policy rules from the employment perspective is then de-
pendent on their specific impact on the implementation of market-oriented reforms: do   -6-
they trigger or hinder market reforms? Moreover, it is decisive whether autonomous 
discretionary policy is able to settle the dispute between interest groups and to support 
the efficiency of structural reforms. 
2.2 A benchmark model 
In the following, we critically discuss the widely held view that the effects of changes in 
the monetary regime on the probability of market-oriented reforms are not predictable 
and speculative in the light of the Lucas critique. We endogenize market liberalization 
in a Barro-Gordon-framework and focus on the long-run effects of reform.
6 The loss 
function of the policy maker includes as bads not only inflation and unemployment but 
also structural reforms. These include reforms of the labor market itself and of other 
areas relevant to the labor market, such as the goods markets, the social security system 
and fiscal policy as e.g. proxied by the Fraser Institute Economic Freedom of the World 
index (Gwartney and Lawson, 2003; Gwartney et al., 2003). In the following, we denote 
these types of reforms as market-oriented reforms. 
In political economy models it is generally assumed that politicians suffer welfare 
losses when implementing market-oriented reforms for two reasons. First, reforms tend 
to reduce at least in the short run the wages of employed insiders, who are frequently 
organized in powerful syndicates (trade unions) and who are the relevant political ma-
jority for re-electing the incumbent government. There is wide evidence that outsiders 
are generally compensated by active labor market policies and public transfers. Market-
oriented reforms can be best interpreted as a downward shift of the seminal wage setting 
curve popularized by Layard, Jackman and Nickell (1994) and Lindbeck (1992) towards 
the employment axis. This shift can be explained by the same factors that are empha-
sized by insider-outsider theories as arguments for the specific slope of the wage setting   -7-
curve. A reform could, e.g., reduce the period in which the unemployed receive unem-
ployment benefits, which is a highly significant determinant of the diverging unem-
ployment rates in OECD countries (Calmfors, 1998; Nickell, 1997). The real reserva-
tion wage of the unemployed would drop proportionally to the degree of reforms.
7 
Second, an intrinsic welfare-enhancing value is attached to existing labor market regula-
tions. They diminish the susceptibility of the employed to shocks (protection against 
unlawful dismissal) and, as in the case of unemployment benefits, inherently bear an 
insurance character (Berthold and Fehn, 1996, Calmfors, 1998, Saint-Paul, 1993, 1996). 
In order to account for these considerations, we augment the usual Lucas type unem-
ployment equation and the hypothesis of rational expectations by an additional condi-
tion: the natural unemployment is linearly dependent on the chosen degree of market-
oriented reforms. We distinguish two scenarios, an autonomous and discretionary 
monetary policy and a non-autonomous, rule-based monetary policy.  
In order to interpret the degree of market-oriented reforms as a rational political choice 
of politicians, the common loss function L is augmented as follows:  
(1)   []
2 2 2 ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( 2 / 1 r u u L γ π π λ + − + − = , 
where  u  is the actual unemployment, u ˆ  is the unemployment target, π  is the actual 
inflation rate, π ˆ  is the inflation target, r corresponds to the actual degree of market-
oriented reforms, λ is the weight of the deviation of inflation from its target and γ repre-
sents the weight of reforms in the loss function ( 0 ≥ r ). To simplify the analysis, we 
assume separability of the loss function, although there are cases where the marginal 
utility of a reform depends on the level of unemployment (Saint-Paul, 1996). 
Unemployment is determined by an expectation augmented Phillips-curve:   -8-
(2)   ε π π β + − − = ) ( *
e u u , with 
(3)   ) (π π E
e = . 
* u  is the natural rate of unemployment, 
e π  is the rationally expected inflation rate and 
ε  is a stochastic i.i.d. shock. The parameter β  characterizes the extent of nominal 
wage rigidities, i.e. the intensity with which real wages react to non-anticipated changes 
in the price level. If the government reduces the inflation rate by one percentage point 
per year it has to accept β  additional percentage points of unemployment. Therefore, 
β  can be considered as the sacrifice ratio (Layard, Jackman and Nickell, 1994: 84-85). 
An additional significant deviation from the standard Barro-Gordon-model is the as-
sumption that the natural rate of unemployment depends on the chosen degree of mar-
ket-oriented reform r  in a linear fashion: 
(4)   r u u δ − = ~ * . 
u ~ is the natural unemployment in the absence market-oriented reforms ( 0 = r ) and δ  
represents the marginal effectiveness of structural reforms with respect to the reduction 
of structural unemployment. 
In the following, we analyze a one-period game, in which politicians determine labor 
market institutions and monetary policy. Decisions on the labor market institutions are 
made before stochastic exogenous shocks occur. They take the inflation-reaction func-
tion into consideration. Once the decision on the labor market arrangement is made, it is 
irreversible. Monetary policy is characterized by more flexibility. Under flexible ex-
change rates, the central bank is able to react to stochastic shocks within a period and 
can stabilize such shocks.   -9-
3. Results from the benchmark model 
3.1. Credible commitment to a strict monetary policy rule 
In order to develop a reference scenario, it is assumed that national politicians can be 
committed to a credible and optimal monetary policy rule. This could be attained either 
by membership in a currency union with an inflation-averse central bank, or by entering 
a credible exchange rate peg (Calmfors 1998: 29).
8 The optimization problem consists 
of simultaneously identifying a monetary policy rule and the degree of market-oriented 
reforms that minimize the government’s loss function.
9 Which values of π , 
e π  and r  
minimize equation (1) taking into account equation (2) and (4) under the assumption of 
rational expectations? 
If the natural and the targeted level of unemployment ( u u ˆ * = ) are equal, the politicians 
choose the same inflation rate as in the case of the optimal monetary policy rule (Barro 
and Gordon, 1983a: 597; Svensson, 1997: 101 ff.). The optimization must therefore be 
carried out with respect to the restriction  u u ˆ * = . Taking rational expectations into ac-
count and substituting 
e π  the optimal monetary policy rule yields: 
(5)   ε β λ β π π )) /( ( ˆ
2 + + = . 
In the optimum, the inflation target π ˆ  is pursued. To stabilize exogenous shocks, how-
ever,  deviations from the inflation target are allowed for.  
On average, neglecting the i.i.d. shocks
10, the degree of reforms amounts to: 
(6)   0 ) ˆ * ( = + − − r u u γ δ  
or equivalently to: 
(6a)  ) /( ) ˆ ~ ( *
2 δ γ δ + − = u u r .   -10-
Equations (6) and (6a) have a number of interesting implications. The degree of market-
oriented reforms is chosen so that the marginal utility of a lower equilibrium unem-
ployment (i.e. the deviation from targeted unemployment weighed with the marginal 
efficiency of structural reforms  ) ˆ * ( u u − −δ ) is equal to the marginal costs of reforms 
( r γ ). What is the economic intuition behind these results? The degree of structural re-
forms is positively related to the level of structural unemployment and the deviation of 
the structural from the politically targeted unemployment respectively ( 0 ~ / * > u r δ δ ). 
The degree of structural reforms is nevertheless negatively related to the marginal costs 
of reforms ( 0 / * < δγ δr ). Simultaneously, the degree of structural reforms is independ-
ent of the nominal level of rigidities ( 0 / * = δβ δr ). Let us now turn to the analysis of 
discretionary policy, which is only possible if there is monetary policy autonomy. 
3.2 Autonomy and discretion: time inconsistency of  
optimal monetary policy 
The empirical literature on the time inconsistency problem of optimal monetary policy 
shows that it is realistic to model the economic decision process of discretionary mone-
tary policy as a two-stage game. In the first stage, wage contracts are fixed on the basis 
of expected inflation. Moreover, the degree of market-oriented reforms is determined 
and exogenous stochastic shocks are realized. In the second stage, monetary policy sets 
the course in a discretionary way. One reason to suppose a discretionary character of the 
game is the low probability of successfully implementing credible commitments to an 
ex ante optimal monetary policy if policy is autonomous and has some leeway. 
The optimization approach in our model essentially remains the same as in the com-
mitment case. The equation to determine the optimal inflation rate 
opt π  is unchanged 
(see eq. (5)). However, the solution is more complicated because in the discretionary   -11-
case it cannot be presupposed that  u u ˆ * = . Considering rational expectations and substi-
tuting 
e π  yields the following monetary reaction function: 
(7)   ε β λ β λ β π π )) /( ( ) ˆ * )( / ( ˆ
2 + + − + = u u . 
In comparison to the commitment case, the additional term  ) ˆ * )( / ( u u − λ β  follows from 
for the time inconsistency problem. Several aspects of this result shed light on the rela-
tion between different monetary regimes and labor market reforms. It is significant that 
the degree of the inflation bias does not only dependent on λ , the relative weight of the 
inflation target in the loss function, but also on parameters which – directly or indirectly 
– are related to labor market reforms. First, there is the dependence on natural unem-
ployment  * u  which is according to equation (4) directly and negatively influenced by 
labor market reforms. Second, the sacrifice ratio β  considerably affects the level of the 
inflation bias.
11 
In the first stage of the game, politicians decide on the degree of reforms, taken the in-
flation reaction function as given. They select r in such a way that the expected loss 
function (1) is minimized under the conditions of equations (2), (4) and (7). In contrast 
to section 3.1, the reaction function for the inflation rate is directly implemented in the 
loss function and not added as an additional condition. When fixing the degree of struc-
tural reforms r  the politicians have to consider that the equilibrium inflation rate de-
pends on the level of natural unemployment. However, the realization of the stochastic 
shock is not recognized until the ex ante optimal degree of reforms is fixed. Therefore, 
not only the stochastic part of equation (7) -  )) ˆ * )( / ( ˆ ( u u − + λ β π  - is used. After opti-
mization, the degree of reform is:   -12-
(6b)  0 ) ˆ * ( ) ˆ * (
2
= − − − − u u u u r
λ
δ β
δ γ , 
or alternatively after some rearrangement: 










γλ λ β δ
λ β δ
. 
In equation (6b), the marginal utility of lower equilibrium unemployment equals the 
marginal cost of reform. In comparison to the commitment case, an additional marginal 
utility component,  λ δ β / ) ˆ * (
2 u u − − , is contained. It can be directly related to the in-
creased utility of a smaller inflation bias  ) ˆ * )( / ( u u − λ β  which is induced by the imple-
mentation of reforms.  
Most important in our context, it can be shown that the degree of structural reforms is 
less in the commitment case than in the case of autonomous and, hence, discretionary 
monetary policy. For that purpose, the right-hand-side of equation (6c) - the degree of 
reforms under discretionary policy - and the right-hand-side of equation (6a) - the de-
gree of reforms under commitment - are compared. 
(8) 
? 0 ) ˆ ~ (
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Obviously, this inequality is fulfilled because  ) (
2 λ β γ +  in the denominator of the sec-
ond fraction is larger than γλ  in the denominator of the first fraction. Both fractions 
only differ by these two parts. The degree of reforms is therefore higher in the case of 
autonomous policy (discretion) and lower in the case of commitment.   -13-
If monetary policy is autonomous, market-oriented reforms seem to achieve a 'double 
dividend' since monetary policy is discretionary. First, the reforms reduce –like a rule-
based monetary policy – the costs of structural unemployment. Secondly, they lessen 
equilibrium inflation since they diminish the credibility problem of discretionary mone-
tary policy. The second effect is absent in the case of rule-based monetary policy. By 
definition rule-based monetary policy does not suffer from a credibility problem. Hence, 
our central question relates to the correlation between reform intensity and the degree of 
autonomy of monetary policy, which might be determined to a large degree by the ex-
change rate regime, at least if the country is small and open (Duval and Elmeskov, 
2005: 9 and 23 ff.). We focus on the notion of monetary policy autonomy instead of 
discretion since we consider it as an important prerequisite of discretionary monetary 
policy. In this respect, our approach strictly follows Duval and Elmeskov (2005: 25) 
who measure the loss of autonomy of monetary policy by the degree of participation in 
any kind of fixed exchange rate agreement. 
More specifically, we will test the following hypotheses: 
(1) The degree of reforms turns out to be higher in the case of monetary policy 
autonomy than under a monetary policy rule. 
(2) This should be valid not only for labor market reforms but also for complemen-
tary reforms in the goods and the financial markets. 
(3) However, if the TINA-view of exchange rate fixing as a structural whip is valid, 
one should expect the contrary, namely a positive impact of a monetary policy 
rule on the extent of reforms.    -14-
Note that one should not conclude on the basis of our theoretical results that a discre-
tionary policy with a higher equilibrium inflation, a higher degree of reforms and lower 
unemployment is generally superior to a rule-based monetary policy. A welfare com-
parison of both alternatives would immediately yield the result that a monetary policy 
rule is generally superior to discretionary monetary policy (Belke and Kamp, 1999). 
Under autonomous and discretionary monetary policy, labor-market reforms turn out to 
be more trenchant and come out to be more successful for the same reason (as measured 
by the degree of lowering the structural unemployment rate), simply because they are 
needed more pressingly. Insofar as a superior (and in the ideal case a perfect) instru-
ment is available for the parallel reduction of the equilibrium inflation rate, namely a 
strict monetary policy rule, the higher degree of labor-market reforms under discretion-
ary monetary policy only signals a form of overshooting. 
3.3 Extension to the open economy case 
Economic openness generally relates to the share of exports and imports in GDP. A 
stronger exposure of firms to international competition is often assumed to increase the 
pressure and the incentives for market-oriented reforms. In open economies, output and 
employment tend to be highly responsive to price competitiveness and, hence, incen-
tives to undertake reforms are large (see, e.g., Katzenstein, 1985, and Nickell, 2005: 2-
3). However, empirical evidence is not especially supportive of the view that open 
economies are more likely to liberalize. Although Pitlik and Wirth (2003) report a posi-
tive impact of economic openness on market-oriented reforms, Herz and Vogel (2004) 
and Pitlik (2004) do not find robust significant coefficients of economic openness for 
their summary indicator. Only the trade policy indicator points to a positive effect of 
economic openness on liberalization. Similarly, the constitutional requirements of po-  -15-
litical decision-making influence the feasibility of policy changes. However, our theo-
retical sections 3.1 and 3.2 indicate a possible solution to this puzzle. The key insight is 
that more open economies are more likely to implement rule-based exchange rate stabi-
lization and, hence, generally implement less reforms. Table 1 illustrates this empirical 
relation between economic openness and exchange rate policy. Exchange rate flexibility 
is measured on a scale from 1 (hard peg) to 4 (free float). The average and median sta-
tistics indicate that less open economies tend to have relatively flexible exchange rate 
regimes, whereas very open economies tend to favor currency fixes. 
- Table 1 about here - 
We continue to assume that the main aim of reforms is to lower structural unemploy-
ment, but use the term monetary policy rule in a more general fashion, i.e. that it com-
prises both monetary and exchange rate policy. Following this notation, we equate the 
case of flexible exchange rates with the case of autonomous and discretionary monetary 
policy and use the notion of a fixed exchange rate system in cases which we originally 
addressed as rule-based monetary policy. But is this generalization legitimate , i.e. to 
interpret our model in terms of exchange rate regimes instead of monetary policy re-
gimes? 
As a stylized fact, the amount of money in an open economy is not determined autono-
mously by the central bank but is determined endogenously by the exchange rate regime 
(see, e.g., Annett, 1993: 25; Krugman and Obstfeld, 2003, chapters 16 and 17). From 
early political business cycle research it is well-known that especially in the case of 
small open economies there is little evidence of rational partisan cycles (rational parti-
san theory RPT), i.e. high and increasing inflation rates under left-wing governments 
and low and diminishing inflation rates under right-wing regimes.
12 In the standard lit-  -16-
erature, the failure to establish partisan cycles is generally traced back to the fact that 
small open economies tend to have fixed exchange rates and, hence, the ability of these 
countries to exert an ideologically motivated impact on the inflation rate is limited.
13 If 
the limited degree of monetary policy autonomy under fixed exchange rates is increased 
by choosing a flexible exchange rate regime, there is more scope for partisan-oriented 
monetary policies. Wage negotiating parties tend to anticipate and account for different 
preferences of political parties only if exchange rates are flexible. Only in this case, 
incumbent governments are able to manipulate the inflation rate by monetary and ex-
change rate policies. Hence, higher inflation rates under left-wing governments induced 
by a dynamic inconsistency problem can only arise, if exchange rates are flexible.
14  
A second argument underpins this view. Assume the existence of an international busi-
ness cycle. In more open economies partisan considerations that arise at the domestic 
level are more likely to affect policymakers’ incentives to engage in international coop-
eration. Left-wing governments cannot credibly commit themselves to international 
cooperation and prefer beggar-thy-neighbor policies so that  the inflation bias of left-
wing governments even increases in open economies. International cooperation, e.g., by 
fixed exchange rate arrangements, tends to eliminate the inflation bias via the same 
mechanism (Lohmann, 1993: 1374 ff.). The final argument in favor of our approach is 
that the hypothesis of an loss of monetary autonomy under fixed exchange rates rests on 
the assumption of perfect international capital mobility. This mobility has increased 
since the start of the 1970s, the beginning of the time period investigated in this paper. 
Empirical studies of the rational partisan theory clearly show that - assuming a mone-
tary model of the exchange rate - party-specific trajectories of money growth and infla-
tion rates go along with proportional movements of the exchange rate. For instance,   -17-
left- wing governments are more likely to experience inflation, capital flight, current 
account deficits and currency devaluation.
15 Hence, we feel justified to equate a flexible 
exchange rate system with a regime of autonomous and discretionary monetary policy 
and a system of fixed exchange rates with a rule-based monetary policy regime. From 
this point of view, our previous arguments that have been elaborated for the concepts 
‘rule-based versus discretionary monetary policy’ can be transferred to those of ‘fixed 
versus flexible exchange rate systems’ and can be tested empirically in a straightfor-
ward fashion. 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Hypotheses 
In general, we now ask whether a significant positive correlation between exchange rate 
flexibility and market liberalization results if the usual impact factors like the macro 
economic environment or political and institutional impediments to economic reforms 
are controlled for. Hence, we test for a significant coefficient of our measure of ex-
change rate flexibility in regressions using reform indices as the dependent variable and 
check for robustness of the results. In accordance with section 3.2, the following hy-
potheses are expected to hold: 
(1) If the view of an overshooting intensity of reforms under monetary policy auton-
omy is correct, the degree of reforms turns will be higher for more flexible ex-
change rates, net of other factors. 
(2) However, if the TINA-view of exchange rate fixing as a structural whip is valid, 
one should expect the contrary, namely a negative impact of exchange rate 
flexibility on the degree of reforms, net of other factors.   -18-
(3) If third factors like the initial need for reforms, the so-called problem pressure, 
dominate the relationship, the exchange rate regime should turn out to be insig-
nificant. 
Note that (1) to (3) should be valid not only for labor market reforms but also for com-
plementary structural reforms in the goods and the financial markets. 
4.2 Data and Definitions 
We estimate and test the conjectured impact of the exchange rate regime on the degree 
of market-oriented reforms based on a panel of 178 countries and a panel of 23 OECD 
economies.
16 Our samples cover the period 1970 to 2000 in order to exploit all available 
data information. However, in view of the problems with the last years of the Bretton 
Woods system which are characterized by still significant capital controls and quite 
autonomous monetary policies, we also consider estimates that exclude the observations 
before 1980. In line with our theoretical model, our empirical analysis focuses on the 
impact of the exchange rate regime on the degree of market-oriented reforms. 
As dependent variable we use the extent of economic liberalization as measured by the 
Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index and the sub-indices money and banking 
system, government size and labor market, credit and business regulation, respectively 
(Gwartney and Lawson 2003, Gwartney et al. 2003). These indices range from one to 
ten, with a high value corresponding to a high level of economic freedom. A positive 
change of the index therefore indicates market-oriented reforms. The EFW index and 
the sub-indices are available in five-year intervals over the period 1970-2000.
17 Hence, 
we focus on a wider policy reform data base than Duval and Elmeskov (2005), who   -19-
investigate data from five key policy areas: unemployment benefit systems, labor taxes, 
employment protection legislation, product market regulation and retirement schemes. 
Among the explaining variables, our discussion focuses on the measure of exchange 
rate flexibility. In section 3.2, we argued that we prefer to measure the loss of autonomy 
of monetary policy by the degree of participation in any kind of fixed exchange rate 
agreement. This approach allows to exploit a wider cross-country / time-series dataset 
of structural reforms than would otherwise be possible. As a result, we feel justified to 
apply an econometric analysis of reform determinants which includes the degree of ex-
change rate flexibility as one of the explanatory variables. However, one obvious draw-
back of our analysis is that it does not cover some of the idiosyncratic characteristics of 
currency unions compared with other fixed exchange-rate arrangements. In particular, 
the EMU example reveals that the adoption of a single currency makes the TINA argu-
ment emphasized in section 2.1 more compelling than in the case of other, less irre-
versible exchange-rate regimes. With an eye on these arguments, we decided to employ 
the Reinhart und Rogoff (2002) index of de facto exchange rate arrangements.
18 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) distinguish between exchange rate pegs (1), limited flexi-
bility (2), managed floating (3), and freely floating (4).
19 Thus, the higher the index 
value the higher is the de facto flexibility of exchange rates. For our purpose and due to 
the time structure of the EFW data, we average the Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) index 
values over five-year intervals. 
The additional control variables that we consider include inflation, economic growth 
and openness as proxies of the pressure to reform. Data are available from the World 
Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2002). Economic openness is defined as 
exports plus imports relative to GDP. To account for the potential endogeneity and in   -20-
accordance with other contributions (e.g., Herz and Vogel, 2005; Lora 2000; Pitlik 
2004; Pitlik and Wirth, 2003), we take these variables in first lags. A final set of con-
trols accounts for political and institutional barriers to policy reforms. Here we include 
POLCON5 and the number of government changes. POLCON5 (Henisz, 2000, 2002) 
measures the effective political restrictions on executive behavior. It accounts for the 
veto powers of the executive, two legislative chambers, the sub national entities and an 
independent judiciary. The index ranges from zero to one, where a higher value indi-
cates stronger political constraints on the government. Given the time structure of our 
dependent variable, we take average values of POLCON5 for the respective five-year 
interval. GOVCHANGES counts the number of government changes that entail a sig-
nificant programmatic reorientation. The data are taken from Beck et al. (2001). The 
credibility and reliability of economic policy is assumed to decrease with the number of 
government changes. Frequent changes shorten the administration’s time horizon and 
lead to a stronger discounting of positive future payoffs from reforms. 
4.3 Empirical model and results 
4.3.1 Empirical model 
To investigate the impact of economic crises and political and institutional characteris-
tics on reforms, we estimate the equation: 
it t i it t i it t i it Y X EXR EFW EFW ε λ η α α α α α + + + + + + + = ∆ − − ' ' 4 1 , 3 2 1 , 1 0 , 
where ∆EFW represents our index of reforms, i.e. the change in economic freedom. 
EXR is our measure for exchange rate flexibility, X is the vector of macroeconomic 
variables (growth, inflation, openness), Y captures the political and institutional deter-
minants of the capacity to reform, and i is a country index Most importantly, we expect 
0 2 < α  to hold, since a high degree of exchange rate flexibility should lead to more re-  -21-
forms (see sections 3.1 and 3.2). However, if the TINA-view is valid, one should expect 
the contrary, namely  0 2 > α . To account for unobserved heterogeneity across countries 
and across time, we add individual-specific ( i η ) and time-specific effects ( t λ ). The lat-
ter should help to capture the systematic impact of omitted variables. The short time 
dimension of our sample complicates the use of country fixed effects, however. There 
are at most six observations per country. Consequently, any estimate of the individual 
effects would be very imprecise, while significantly reducing the degrees of freedom. 
To avoid these problems, a common approach is to estimate a within-group transforma-
tion (e.g., Pitlik, 2004; Pitlik and Wirth, 2003). The within transformation considers 
differences from the respective country average. As a result, country dummies and time-
invariant indicators drop out (Baltagi, 1995; Hsiao, 2003). The flip side is that the 
within transformation neglects the cross-sectional information in the data. It does not 
allow to estimate the impact of time-invariant cross-sectional differences on economic 
reform. To include the cross-sectional differences, which should account for most of the 
variation in our sample, we also run a pooled OLS regression without individual-
specific effects. The latter exploits both the cross-sectional information and the time 
dimension in our sample. The downside here is that pooled OLS estimates without 
country effects can be subject to the omitted variable bias. 
4.3.2 Results 
This section presents the regression results for our broad country sample and for the 
sample of high-income OECD economies, respectively. We report the regression results 
for overall liberalization, money and banking system, government size and market regu-
lation as dependent variables. Tables 2 to 7 display the panel estimates from the OLS   -22-
within transformation, which neglects the variance across countries, and from pooled 
OLS, which exploits the time and the country dimension of our sample without includ-
ing individual fixed effects.  
- Tables 2 and 3 about here - 
A robust result in all regressions is the negative impact of the initial level of economic 
freedom on the extent of subsequent market-oriented reforms. The higher the initial 
level of economic freedom, the lower are the scope and the need for further liberaliza-
tion and the higher is conditional policy convergence (Duval and Elmeskov, 2005: 23 
ff.). The main interest of our paper lies on the impact of the exchange rate system on 
market-oriented reforms, however. Here, we find a robust negative impact of higher 
exchange rate flexibility on overall liberalization, as measured by the chain-linked EFW 
index, in our world-wide sample. This result does not carry over to the sub-sample of 
OECD economies, however. In the latter case, we obtain insignificant or even positive 
coefficients. Neither is the positive impact of fixed exchange rates on the degree of lib-
eralization replicated for the sub-indices government size and market regulation. For 
both measures we obtain either insignificant or positive coefficients.  
- Tables 4 and 5 about here - 
How can we reconcile the different findings for the overall index, on the one hand, and 
the sub-indices, on the other hand? A candidate explanation is that the positive impact 
of fixed exchange rates on market-oriented reforms is entirely driven by its positive 
impact on price stability and the credibility of monetary policy. The significantly nega-
tive impact of exchange rate flexibility on the monetary and banking reform index in 
most of the regressions in the world sample supports this hypothesis and our prior from 
section 2.1 (see Tables 4 and 5). As a further element, the fact that our sub-indices are   -23-
not chain-linked reduces the reliability of the respective data, and it may distort the re-
sults. 
- Tables 6 to 9 about here - 
Taken together, the insignificant or even positive parameter estimates for the impact of 
exchange rate flexibility on government sector reform and on market deregulation con-
tradict the hypothesis that the exchange rate commitment has a positive impact on struc-
tural reforms. Concerning the other explanatory variables, we find a significant negative 
impact of the initial levels of economic freedom on subsequent reforms. Furthermore, 
we find a robust positive impact of political constraints on liberalization and, in the 
worldwide sample, a negative impact of frequent government changes. A more detailed 
discussion of similar results in a different model context is given in Herz and Vogel 
(2005) and Pitlik (2004). 
4.3.3 Robustness Checks 
The results in Tables 2 to 9 are retrieved from OLS-within and pooled OLS estimations. 
For each of the four different reform indices, we present both the world sample and 
OECD sample based estimates. One problem of both within and pooled OLS is that it 
does not account for the dynamic structure of our regression equation and for the possi-
ble endogeneity of contemporary explanatory variables. The inclusion of a lagged de-
pendent variable and the possible endogeneity of other explanatory variables violate the 
assumption of strict exogeneity in static panel regressions (see Baltagi, 1995; Hsiao, 
2003 for a detailed discussion). The endogeneity of explanatory variables potentially 
applies to both the economic indicators and the political and institutional characteristics. 
The possibility of reverse causation is most obvious for the macroeconomic indicators, 
which is the reason why we use them as lagged values in our analysis. Economic crises   -24-
may affect economic policy, but economic policy also impacts on economic perform-
ance. Reverse causation may also apply to variables like the stability of government and 
the number of effective veto players, however.  
We therefore rerun the regression with the instrumental variable General Method of 
Moments estimator (IV-GMM) by Arellano and Bond (1991). IV-GMM deals with in-
dividual fixed effects and endogeneity. It estimates the regression equation in first dif-
ferences and uses lagged values of the regressors as instruments (Baltagi, 1995; Hsiao, 
2003). The drawback, as with OLS-within, is that the differencing disregards the cross-
sectional information in our data. Secondly, the time dimension of our data set is short 
and the availability of lagged variable values as instruments therefore very limited. As a 
robustness check we applied the IV-GMM estimator to our worldwide sample. We fo-
cus on the one-step GMM estimates. The results are similar to the OLS estimates. They 
replicate the negative impact of exchange rate flexibility on overall liberalization and 
the insignificant parameter estimates for the sub fields of government size and market 
regulation. The only difference is that the impact of the exchange rate regime on money 
and banking sector reform appears insignificant in the GMM estimation.
20 
Our empirical analysis supposes that the exchange rate regime reflects the degree of 
monetary commitment or autonomy (discretion). Flexible exchange rates indicate 
autonomy and a discretionary monetary policy, whereas a fixing indicates the adoption 
of a monetary rule. Monetary commitment, in turn, does not necessarily imply a fixed 
exchange rate, however. Hence, we check the robustness of our results using an alterna-
tive indicator of monetary policy commitment in order to make sure that our definition 
of monetary autonomy does not create a bias in the estimations – probably in the direc-
tion of not finding any effects (Freytag, 2005). The indicator is available for a smaller   -25-
set of countries only, which basically coincides with the 23 high-income OECD econo-
mies. The data are only available at the frequency of decades. Therefore, including the 
monetary commitment indicator reduces our data set to the OECD sub-sample with at 
maximum three observations per country.  
- Tables 10 and 11 about here - 
The results of this exercise are displayed in Tables 10 and 11. We find the commitment 
indicator to be insignificant in explaining overall liberalization. The result is compatible 
with the insignificance of the exchange rate regime in the OECD sample regression. For 
the money and banking sector we obtain an insignificant (pooled OLS) or a positively 
significant (within) coefficient on commitment, which is compatible with the results in 
Table 5 above. The commitment proxy is insignificant in the case of government sector 
reform, thus broadly reproducing the results in Table 7. Finally, monetary commitment 
appears to have a positive impact on market liberalization in the within regression, but 
not for pooled OLS. This contrasts the picture in Table 9, where exchange rate flexibil-
ity is either insignificant or appears to promote liberalization. 
Finally, we check a few properties of the model derived in section 3.2 empirically and 
use this as a robustness check. One precondition for more reforms under a discretionary 
regime derived in section 3.2 was a generally low level of inflation. The lower the level 
of inflation is, the stronger are the incentives to inflate since the marginal gains of infla-
tion, in the form of a lower natural rate of unemployment, rise with decreasing inflation 
(Akerlof, Dickens and Perry, 1996, and Calmfors, 1997: 24). From this perspective, 
lower initial inflation should lead to a higher degree of reforms under policy autonomy, 
i.e. flexible exchange rates.   -26-
In order to test this hypothesis empirically, we used 30% inflation as a threshold and 
applied both an interaction term „inflation dummy times exchange rate regime“. Since 
the number of high inflation periods is small within the OECD, we only consider the 
world sample in this case . This leads to the following results. Including the interaction 
term „inflation dummy times exchange rate regime“ even increases the negative impact 
of flexibility on reforms based on the index of overall liberalization. This result clearly 
contradicts the hypothesis of low inflation as a catalyst of more reforms. Analogously, 
the impact of exchange rate flexibility on reforms of the government sector is higher 
(significant positive instead of insignificance) with high inflation. In contrast, the dif-
ferent notions of high and low inflation do not play any role for the degree of market 
regulation. In both cases, the exchange rate regime and the inflation variable are insig-
nificant. If we apply the monetary and banking reform index, the interaction term „infla-
tion dummy times exchange rate regime“ turns out to be insignificant. Hence, also in 
this case low inflation does not lead to a higher degree of reforms if there is policy 
autonomy in the form of flexible exchange rates.
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The main results of our analysis about the impact of exchange rate commitment on eco-
nomic reform can be summarized as follows. For our broad country sample, the adop-
tion of an exchange rate rule is positively correlated with market-oriented reforms in 
general, and with reforms in the money and banking sector in particular. For the gov-
ernment sector and for market regulation, we do not find a robust significant effect, 
however. We can thus assume that it is the positive impact of exchange rate commit-
ment on the money and banking sector that accounts for the positive impact on market-
oriented reforms in general. In the case of the OECD sample we do not find evidence 
for a significant impact of a rule-based or discretionary exchange rate policy on eco-  -27-
nomic reforms . The use of an alternative indicator of monetary policy commitment 
supports these findings. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we estimated and tested the relationship between exchange rate regimes 
and the degree of economic reforms by estimating panel regressions. As dependent 
variable we used the degree of market-oriented reforms. As independent variables we 
included indicators of the flexibility of the exchange rate system, the stability of mone-
tary policy and further control variables like economic performance as a proxy of re-
form pressure and institutional impediments to further reform. The results of our em-
pirical analysis suggest that the adoption of an exchange rate rule is positively corre-
lated with market-oriented reforms in a broad world sample, and with reforms in the 
money and banking sector in particular. For the government sector and for market regu-
lation, we do not find a robust significant effect, however. The impact of  exchange rate 
policy on economic reforms is not significant in the sample of OECD countries. The use 
of an alternative indicator of monetary policy commitment supports these findings.  
Seen on the whole, these results do not confirm the implications of our Calmfors-type 
model, namely that one should observe a higher (overshooting) degree of reforms under 
monetary policy autonomy. Instead, one should stress another important implication of 
our theoretical model: autonomous discretionary policy achieves a lower total welfare 
than rule-based monetary policy. This is valid in spite of the higher partial incentive to 
implement labor market reforms contained in the model. Insofar as a superior instru-
ment is available for the parallel reduction of the equilibrium inflation rate, namely a 
significant reduction of monetary policy autonomy, the higher degree of labor-market   -28-
reforms under discretionary monetary policy which we found empirical evidence for 
only signals a form of overshooting. Such kinds of reform are not beneficial anyway 
and cannot be corroborated empirically in our investigation. 
However, our empirical results at least partly confirm the TINA argument that limiting 
monetary policy autonomy (like a common monetary policy under EMU from the per-
spective of a single EMU-in country) tends to raise the probability of the implementa-
tion of structural reforms / liberalisation steps. The elimination of the exchange rate 
option seems to extend the incentives for painful but long-term beneficial institutional 
adjustments on labor and product markets for developing countries and emerging mar-
kets. This might represent an important message for those who have to decide about the 
entry into a currency union or a hard currency peg. 
Finally, the exchange rate regime often turned out to be insignificant when we applied it 
to reforms in areas other than the money and banking system. Instead, the usual sus-
pects like problem pressure as measured by the initial degree of freedom dominate the 
regressions. In a sense, one could even argue that a change in a nominal variable like for 
instance the exchange rate regime, appears to have mainly effects on other nominal 
variables like the monetary and banking system, a view often condemned as too pessi-
mistic in the discussions during the run-up to the Euro. From this perspective, our re-
sults are strikingly similar to the huge amount of non-results which Duval and El-
meskov (2005) found for their sample of EMU countries. Hence, the upshot of our 
study is that one should not exaggerate the impact of monetary policy autonomy and the 
exchange rate regime on economic freedom in view of a large status-quo bias and path-
dependence of reform intensity. There is no empirical base for the argument that discre-  -29-
tionary monetary policy is favorable because it gives more incentives for structural re-
forms. This insight probably represents the most robust result of this contribution. 
                                                           
Endnotes 
1    OECD (2005) applies a consistent procedure to derive policy priorities to foster growth 
across OECD countries and identifies labor market reforms as being particularly important 
in, e.g., the Euro area. However, this does not at all imply that reforms in other areas are un-
important. Hence, we analyze a variety of different reform measures in the empirical part of 
the paper. 
2  Van Poeck and Borghijs (2001) argue that the prospect of qualifying for EMU should pro-
vide as big an incentive for labor-market reform as EMU membership itself. They conclude 
that EMU countries did not reform more than other countries and, unlike elsewhere, their 
progress on reform seemed unrelated to the initial level of unemployment. For a period from 
the early nineties up to 1999, Bertola and Boeri (2001), they only focus cash transfers to 
people of working age, e.g. unemployment benefits, and on job protection. They arrive at 
exactly opposite conclusions, i.e. reforms accelerated more in the euro area than outside. 
  The IMF (2004) looks at the impact of a range of factors including macroeconomic condi-
tions, political institutions, reform design and variables aimed to capture attitudes towards 
structural reform on different policy areas across OECD countries from the mid-1970s up to 
the late 1990s. It finds that EU membership leads to faster moves towards liberalization of 
product markets. However, it does not clarify whether this represents an effect of EMU 
and/or policies to prepare for EMU. See also Duval and Elmeskov (2005), p. 10. 
3   For a recent survey of the arguments see Duval and Elmeskov (2005) and Hochreiter and 
Tavlas (2005). 
4   See Alogoskoufis (1994), Calmfors (1997), Duval and Elmeskov (2005: 6), Mélitz (1997) 
and Sibert and Sutherland (1997).   -30-
                                                                                                                                                                          
5   See, Bean (1998), Calmfors (1998: 28); Duval and Elmeskov (2005: 5) and Saint-Paul and 
Bentolila (2000). 
6  The analytical framework was initially developed by Barro and Gordon (1983, 1983a), 
Kydland and Prescott (1977), Sibert and Sutherland (1997), and Svensson (1997).  
7  Alternatively, labor market reforms might contain the reduction of unemployment benefits, 
the rise of the efficiency of labor market policy, the substitution of collective by individual 
wage negotiations, lower minimum wages for young employees, the revision of the laws of 
wage negotiations (increasing the negotiation power of employees) and the reduction of both 
taxes and employment protection. 
8    McCallum (1995) and Jensen (1997) both refer to the problem that the combination of 
”delegation and proper incentive schemes” is not able to eliminate the inflation bias com-
pletely as long as a discretionary national stabilization policy is maintained. 
9   Concerning the structure of the game, the expected loss function should be minimized. But 
for clarity of exposition, the expectations operator is left out.  
10  Strictly speaking, the monetary rule can in this case simply be expressed as a k-percent rule 
without feedback component. 
11   An increase of nominal rigidities intensifies the credibility problem of monetary policy. 
Hence, the incentive of politicians to reduce the increasing credibility problem by more labor 
market reforms expands. However, this effect should be - and actually is according to our es-
timates in section 4.3 - less relevant in praxi if the nominal rigidities are diminished by mar-
ket-oriented reforms, resulting in higher wage flexibility. 
12  Early sources are Alesina (1992: 13-14), Alesina and Roubini (1992: 680) and Annett (1993: 
25 and 42). 
13  See Alogoskoufis, Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1992: 1384) and Ellis and Thoma (1990: 
17 and 24).   -31-
                                                                                                                                                                          
14  See Alesina and Roubini (1992: 673-674), Alogoskoufis and Philippopoulos (1992: 397), 
Alogoskoufis, Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1992: 1370-1371) and Annett (1993: 25 and 
33). 
15   See Simmons (1994: 59), Ellis and Thoma (1990) estimate rational partisan theory ap-
proaches for open economies. In their study, party-specific inflation rates lead to party spe-
cific differences in exchange rate movements. 
16  The 23 OECD economies correspond to the category high-income industrialized countries in 
the World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2002) and cover Australia, Can-
ada, the former EU-15, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United 
States. 
17  We use the chain-weighted EFW index (Gwartney et al., 2003), which corrects for the lim-
ited availability of some components over time. This chain-linked index is only available for 
the summary indicator, however. For the sub areas government size and market regulation 
we have to rely on uncorrected data.  
18  The de facto measure improves on the de jure classification of IMF (2003) since it takes into 
account that de jure exchange rate regimes are not necessarily applied in practice. This has 
especially been the case in developing countries but also in industrialized countries. Austria, 
e.g., had a de facto fixed exchange rate regime vis-à-vis Germany for a long time without be-
ing a formal member of the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS. See Hochreiter and Tav-
las (2005). 
19  Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) include freely falling rates as an additional category. We add the 
cases of freely falling rates to the free-float category, however. 
20  The results are available on request. 
21  The results are available on request.   -32-
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- Summary indicator 
- Money and banking system 
- Government size 
- Regulation 
Gwartney et al. (2003) 
Exchange rate regime  Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) 
Monetary commitment  Freytag (2005) 
Inflation  OECD (2002), World Bank (2002) 
Economic growth  OECD (2002), World Bank (2002) 
Economic openness (trade/ GDP)  OECD (2002), World Bank (2002) 
Political constraints (POLCON5)  Henisz (2000, 2002) 
Number of government changes 
(GOVCHANGES) 
Beck et al. (2001) 
    
Tables 
Table 1. Economic openness and exchange rate regimes 1970-2000 
Degree of openness (Trade/ GDP) Average  Median  Observations 
< 0.25  2.65  2.93  60 
0.25-0.75 2.27  2  471 
0.75-1.25 1.98  2  200 
> 1.25   1.51  1  59 
Sources: The data on exchange rate flexibility are taken from Reinhart and Rogoff (2002). We measure 
economic openness as the sum of exports plus imports relative to GDP). The data are extracted from the 
World Development Indicators database (World Bank 2002). 
 Table 2. World sample panel estimates for overall liberalization (t-values in parentheses, significance levels: 10% *, 5% **, 1% ***)  
EFW period 1970-2000  EFW period 1980-2000   
OLS within  OLS pooled  OLS within  OLS pooled 
































Inflation (t-1)    0.01 
(0.50)    0.01 
(0.37)    0.01 
(0.47)    0.01 
(0.25) 
Growth (t-1)    1.03 
(1.33)    0.18 
(0.22)    0.94 
(1.21)    0.27 
(0.30) 
Openness (t-1)    0.08 
(0.18)    0.07 
(0.71)    0.29 
(0.64)    0.14 
(1.35) 
POLCONV   0.95*** 
(4.48)    0.90*** 
(7.35)    1.13*** 
(4.89)    0.84*** 
(6.42) 
GOVCHANGES   -0.13*** 
(-2.87)    -0.07** 
(-2.23)    -0.13*** 
(-2.59)    -0.07* 
(-1.84) 
Constant     0.64*** 
(3.98) 
1.56*** 




Time effects (chi²)  195.1***  71.98***  178.9***  64.78***  111.4***  68.16***  73.04***  60.45*** 
R² 0.47  0.45  0.33  0.33  0.40  0.47  0.24  0.33 
Observations 518  433  521  438  397  370  400  375  
Table 3. OECD sample panel estimates for overall liberalization (t-values in parentheses, significance levels: 10% *, 5% **, 1% ***)  
EFW period 1970-2000  EFW period 1980-2000   
OLS within  OLS pooled  OLS within  OLS pooled 
































Inflation (t-1)    -0.21 
(-0.59)    0.42 
(1.00)    -0.57 
(-0.69)    0.97** 
(2.40) 
Growth (t-1)    -3.43 
(-1.39)    -3.57* 
(-1.78)    -4.52 
(-1.30)    -3.19 
(-1.26) 
Openness (t-1)    -0.93 
(-1.57)    0.12 
(1.42)    -0.32 
(-0.39)    0.10 
(1.29) 
POLCONV   1.03*** 
(5.20)    1.01** 
(2.33)    1.13** 
(2.34)    0.38 
(0.77) 
GOVCHANGES   -0.05 
(-0.84)    -0.05 
(-1.13)    -0.01 
(-0.19)    -0.03 
(-0.84) 
Constant     0.41*** 
(2.60) 
1.59*** 




Time effects (chi²)  89.28***  21.90***  142.7***  32.57***  26.79***  23.66***  37.59***  43.51*** 
R² 0.69  0.48  0.61  0.43  0.41  0.45  0.33  0.39 
Observations 135  112  135  112  90  90  90  90  
Table 4. World sample panel estimates for money and banking (t-values in parentheses, significance levels: 10% *, 5% **, 1% ***)  
Money and banking period 1970-2000  Money and banking period 1980-2000   
OLS within  OLS pooled  OLS within  OLS pooled 
































Inflation (t-1)    0.10*** 
(5.39)    0.06*** 
(4.06)    0.10*** 
(5.55)    0.06*** 
(3.80) 
Growth (t-1)    9.01*** 
(4.67)    6.86*** 
(3.48)    8.24*** 
(3.77)    8.53*** 
(4.01) 
Openness (t-1)    0.79 
(0.93)    0.07 
(0.34)    1.51 
(1.60)    0.13 
(0.57) 
POLCONV   0.96* 
(1.75)    1.36*** 
(6.07)    1.17* 
(1.67)    1.31*** 
(4.85) 
GOVCHANGES   -0.41*** 
(-3.46)    -0.23** 
(-2.41)    -0.57*** 
(-3.83)    -0.19* 
(-1.71) 
Constant     1.44*** 
(4.84) 
2.33*** 




Time effects (chi²)  102.1***  44.25***  106.1***  33.20***  49.02***  34.60***  37.42***  26.29*** 
R² 0.46  0.45  0.27  0.31  0.44  0.48  0.23  0.32 
Observations 584  460  586  465  401  371  403  376  
Table 5. OECD sample panel estimates for money and banking (t-values in parentheses, significance levels: 10% *, 5% **, 1% ***)  
Money and banking period 1970-2000  Money and banking period 1980-2000   
OLS within  OLS pooled  OLS within  OLS pooled 
































Inflation (t-1)    -1.39 
(-0.80)    -1.60 
(-1.08)    -7.75*** 
(-3.30)    -5.09** 
(-3.01) 
Growth (t-1)    -0.03 
(-0.00)    -1.08 
(-0.14)    -3.50 
(-0.30)    -0.13 
(-0.02) 
Openness (t-1)    -2.97 
(-1.63)    -0.09 
(-0.59)    -0.69 
(-0.31)    0.05 
(0.25) 
POLCONV   1.54* 
(1.94)    1.85*** 
(4.55)    3.57*** 
(3.88)    2.74*** 
(4.47) 
GOVCHANGES   -0.10 
(-0.50)    -0.01 
(-0.10)    -0.04 
(-0.16)    0.01 
(0.08) 
Constant     1.48*** 
(5.20) 
2.13*** 




Time effects (chi²)  62.65***  14.82***  45.71***  14.59***  17.10***  8.725**  14.75***  11.13** 
R² 0.45  0.35  0.38  0.36  0.41  0.45  0.45  0.49 
Observations 135  112  135  112  90  90  90  90  
Table 6. World sample panel estimates for government size (t-values in parentheses, significance levels: 10% *, 5% **, 1% ***)  
Government size period 1970-2000  Government size period 1980-2000   
OLS within  OLS pooled  OLS within  OLS pooled 
































Inflation (t-1)    0.01 
(0.21)    0.01 
(0.30)    0.01 
(0.23)    0.01 
(0.29) 
Growth (t-1)    -2.44* 
(-1.85)    -2.21 
(-1.50)    -2.88** 
(-2.14)    -2.25 
(-1.33) 
Openness (t-1)    0.47 
(1.01)    -0.18 
(-1.41)    0.54 
(1.21)    -0.08 
(-0.53) 
POLCONV   0.55** 
(2.00)    0.07 
(0.48)    0.76** 
(2.40)    0.11 
(0.72) 
GOVCHANGES   -0.16** 
(-2.52)    -0.08 
(-1.55)    -0.09 
(-1.26)    -0.02 
(-0.36) 
Constant     0.72*** 
(3.24) 
0.84*** 




Time effects (chi²)  95.84***  43.67***  133.1***  91.57***  45.77***  24.14***  21.66***  15.01*** 
R² 0.46  0.47  0.26  0.23  0.47  0.52  0.16  0.16 
Observations 560  456  567  461  385  369  392  374  
Table 7. OECD sample panel estimates for government size (t-values in parentheses, significance levels: 10% *, 5% **, 1% ***)  
Government size period 1970-2000  Government size period 1980-2000   
OLS within  OLS pooled  OLS within  OLS pooled 
































Inflation (t-1)    1.82* 
(1.95)    1.63* 
(1.89)    0.55 
(0.58)    2.10** 
(2.34) 
Growth (t-1)    -7.85** 
(-2.13)    -11.1*** 
(-3.22)    -6.55 
(-1.17)    -7.49* 
(-1.82) 
Openness (t-1)    -1.96 
(-1.43)    0.01 
(0.04)    -1.78 
(-1.00)    -0.07 
(-0.46) 
POLCONV   2.29*** 
(4.51)    0.60* 
(1.71)    3.36*** 
(5.26)    0.46 
(0.83) 
GOVCHANGES   -0.08 
(-1.07)    -0.07 
(-1.06)    -0.09 
(-1.02)    -0.06 
(-0.81) 
Constant     0.03 
(0.11) 
-0.27 




Time effects (chi²)  38.99***  16.37***  64.58***  59.99***  11.12**  3.716  9.308**  9.220** 
R² 0.50  0.52  0.37  0.35  0.36  0.45  0.14  0.22 
Observations 135  112  135  112  90  90  90  90 
  
Table 8. World sample panel estimates for regulation (t-values in parentheses, significance levels: 10% *, 5% **, 1% ***)  
Regulation period 1970-2000  Regulation period 1980-2000   
OLS within  OLS pooled  OLS within  OLS pooled 
































Inflation (t-1)    0.03 
(0.74)    0.05 
(1.62)    0.03 
(0.86)    0.05 
(1.56) 
Growth (t-1)    0.22 
(0.23)    0.57 
(0.74)    -0.11 
(-0.10)    0.18 
(0.23) 
Openness (t-1)    0.05 
(0.12)    0.16 
(1.53)    0.02 
(0.04)    0.21* 
(1.81) 
POLCONV   0.22 
(0.91)    0.64*** 
(6.66)    0.31 
(1.11)    0.71*** 
(6.64) 
GOVCHANGES   -0.08* 
(-1.79)    -0.02 
(-0.61)    -0.06 
(-1.12)    -0.02 
(-0.47) 
Constant     1.13*** 
(5.48) 
1.09*** 




Time effects (chi²)  118.8***  110.7***  128.5***  95.04***  109.1***  97.07***  124.0***  87.75*** 
R² 0.48  0.48  0.27  0.37  0.51  0.51  0.29  0.38 
Observations 477  408  482  414  376  351  381  357  
Table 9. OECD sample panel estimates for regulation (t-values in parentheses, significance levels: 10% *, 5% **, 1% ***)  
Regulation period 1970-2000  Regulation period 1980-2000   
OLS within  OLS pooled  OLS within  OLS pooled 
































Inflation (t-1)    -0.25 
(-0.45)    0.39 
(1.22)    -0.79 
(-1.28)    0.31 
(0.93) 
Growth (t-1)    -6.06** 
(-2.40)    -6.62*** 
(-3.06)    -5.65* 
(-1.92)    -7.33*** 
(-3.45) 
Openness (t-1)    -1.27 
(-1.33)    0.06 
(0.80)    -1.13 
(-0.96)    0.09 
(1.07) 
POLCONV   -1.34*** 
(-3.64)    0.18 
(0.74)    -1.07** 
(-2.20)    0.04 
(0.10) 
GOVCHANGES   0.04 
(0.63)    -0.04 
(-1.10)    0.09 
(0.96)    -0.06 
(-1.38) 
Constant     0.66*** 
(2.78) 
0.95*** 




Time effects (chi²)  198.5***  262.4***  147.0***  131.3***  201.8***  179.6***  130.1***  139.0** 
R² 0.67  0.72  0.54  0.58  0.73  0.76  0.57  0.60 
Observations 134  112  134  112  90  90  90  90 
 Table 10. Monetary commitment estimates for overall and financial sector reform  
EFW  Money and banking   
OLS within  OLS pooled  OLS within  OLS pooled 
































Inflation (t-1)    3.90*** 
(3.11)    2.58*** 
(3.64)    11.2** 
(2.52)    3.10 
(1.10) 
Growth (t-1)    7.41** 
(2.42)    1.21 
(0.38)    20.0** 
(2.28)    18.2** 
(2.23) 
Openness (t-1)    -0.93 
(-1.60)    -0.24* 
(-1.91)    -4.04* 
(-1.77)    -0.24 
(-0.62) 
POLCONV   0.87 
(1.23)    0.53 
(0.99)    0.73 
(0.28)    2.86*** 
(3.42) 
GOVCHANGES   0.09 
(1.24)    -0.02 
(-0.32)    0.46 
(1.57)    0.10 
(0.63) 
Constant     1.24*** 
(4.23) 
0.28 




Time effects (chi²)  39.07***  72.40***  94.61***  92.32***  18.59***  11.52***  18.78***  13.55*** 
R² 0.81  0.90  0.73  0.78  0.61  0.76  0.50  0.59 
Observations 59  58  59  58  59  58  59  58 
 
  
Table 11. Monetary commitment estimates for government sector and regulation reform 
Government size  Market regulation   
OLS within  OLS pooled  OLS within  OLS pooled 
































Inflation (t-1)    4.84* 
(1.81)    3.04*** 
(3.55)    11.2** 
(2.52)    3.10 
(1.10) 
Growth (t-1)    2.68 
(0.42)    -16.4*** 
(-3.54)    20.0** 
(2.28)    18.2** 
(2.23) 
Openness (t-1)    -0.08 
(-0.10)    -0.80 
(-1.59)    -4.04* 
(-1.77)    -0.24 
(-0.62) 
POLCONV   3.30** 
(2.09)    2.64** 
(2.24)    0.73 
(0.28)    2.86*** 
(3.42) 
GOVCHANGES   0.11 
(0.49)    -0.12 
(-0.71)    0.46 
(1.57)    0.10 
(0.63) 
Constant     -0.05 
(-0.12) 
-1.13 




Time effects (chi²)  22.88***  46.26***  49.98***  22.59***  94.97***  11.52***  172.1***  13.55*** 
R² 0.82  0.88  0.55  0.68  0.87  0.76  0.70  0.59 
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